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Between World Wars I and II the national interests of the United States in the Far East outstripped our capability to defend them by force of arms. The official resolution of this security problem was established in agreements reached at Washington in 1922, one of which was the limitation of size and composition of the U.S. Navy and other navies. Many naval officers disagreed with the concepts underlying this security system, which did not survive Japanese expansionism in the decade before Pearl Harbor.

THE UNITED STATES NAVY—STRATEGY AND FAR EASTERN FOREIGN POLICY, 1931-1941

by

Michael K. Doyle

The Pacific phase of the Second World War was almost exclusively an American Naval operation. As such it was, just as U.S. Navy war planners in the 1920's and 1930's had anticipated in their Basic War Plan ORANGE, a "war, primarily naval" in its prosecution. The vast expanse of the Pacific and the great distances separating the nation from its outlying possessions clearly dictated that in a war with a Far Eastern enemy the U.S. Navy would have to bear the brunt of the fighting. It would also be responsible for the logistical support of American ground forces whose mission it would be to dislodge the enemy from the many island groups and archipelagos of the Pacific. But these same planners had also been aware of the almost insurmountable difficulties of a far-flung naval campaign in the Western Pacific. Many of these difficulties Navy planners attributed to the shortsighted nature of American Far Eastern diplomacy beginning with the Washington Conference of 1921-1922. Theoretical discussions among officers in the Office of Naval Operations, papers prepared by the General Board of the Navy, and Operations Problems and theses done at the Naval War College in these years all concluded that the United States would be at a severe disadvantage from the outset in a war against Japan.[1]

These dismal conclusions never officially surfaced in the Navy's war planning, yet they were common knowledge. The Navy's Basic War Plan ORANGE for use in a Japanese-American war was formulated in conjunction with the Army members of the Joint Army-Navy Board. Basic War Plan ORANGE called for the rapid advance

of the U.S. Fleet into the Western Pacific at the beginning of a war with Japan. It was this plan which formed the basis of virtually all American strategic planning prior to the outbreak of the European war in 1939. With war in Europe imminent, the Joint Board began developing the RAINBOW series of contingency plans, in which ORANGE was included.[2]

Two considerations prompted the decision to move the fleet rapidly into the Western Pacific at the start of a war against Japan. First, there was general agreement that the Japanese would seek to establish outlying bases in the Marshall and Caroline Islands. They would then remain on the strategic defensive. Hence it would be necessary to carry the war to the Japanese. Second, to prosecute a successful strategic offensive across the Pacific the U.S. Fleet would require a base west of Hawaii. Preferably this base would be at Manila. But American strategists held few illusions about the availability of the Manila base in a war with Japan. Undoubtedly the Japanese would plan to seize one or more of the Philippines. Possibly a fast fleet could arrive in time to prevent the fall of Manila. Since this was unlikely, quick American action might still successfully establish a fleet base somewhere else in the islands.[3]

In the Navy's opinion the Japanese would respond to any movement of the fleet west of Hawaii with attrition tactics intended to reduce the fleet's strength sufficiently to permit the weaker Japanese Navy to win a decisive fleet action somewhere in the vicinity of the Philippines. If the U.S. Fleet possessed sufficient overall tonnage in battleships and auxiliary combat craft, and a well-developed, well-defended fleet base in the Western Pacific, then the projected movement of the fleet from Hawaii to the Philippines would have an excellent chance of achieving its objectives. Navy planners pointed out, however, that the Navy could meet none of these conditions during the 1930's. Furthermore they doubted that the antiquated defenses at Manila could fend off a Japanese attack until the arrival of the fleet. Finally, there was no doubt at all that the fleet would enter Philippine waters with a number of units severely damaged, possibly with no place to go for repairs.[4]

However dismal the prospects for U.S. forces at the outset of war against Japan, Navy planners were confident that America would triumph eventually. Nonetheless they believed such a war would be long and costly because of the inadequate state of American forces at the start of the conflict. The awareness that American victory in a Pacific war could come only through a large and sustained effort led Navy planners to worry about the willingness of the American public to support a long war in the Far East. Given the nation's isolationist temper and its lackadaisical response to Japan's aggression in China in the 1930's, some officers anticipated that the public might not accept the sacrifices necessary to regain territory that would certainly be lost to the Japanese at the beginning of a Far Eastern war.[5]

Herein lay the crux of the problem, not only for naval strategists, but for diplomats as well. Statesmen and admirals in these years were confronted with a task no different in its essentials from the perennial problem of coordinating national policy and defense. In short, was the American stake in the Far East, specifically in the Philippines and China, worth fighting for if threatened by the actions of other powers?

There was no unequivocal answer to this problem until the Japanese supplied one by their actions between September 1940 and December 1941. By signing the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, the Japanese government linked the war in China, in progress since 1937, with the war in Europe. No longer could American officials persist in seeing the

two theaters as separate. Rather, they now joined the Atlantic and Pacific conflicts into an overall diplomatic and strategic problem in a manner previously inconceivable. Henceforth sustaining the British Empire became a key objective in both American foreign and defense policy. As long as the British could with American assistance continue to resist the Axis in Europe, it might also be possible to contain Japanese expansionist pressure on the regions of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.[6]

The threat of a second world war prompted the resolution of the ambiguities which had plagued American Far Eastern foreign and defense policy. Symptomatic of those ambiguities was the nation's inability to support its Far Eastern policies with force if need be. At least this was the opinion articulated throughout the 1920's and 1930's by Navy publicists in print and by officers whose responsibility it was to estimate the nation's naval defense requirements.

For simplicity's sake, what may be termed the Navy view was that since the 1921-1922 Washington Conference American diplomats, the Congress, and the public generally had chosen to ignore the fundamental truth that a nation's diplomacy can attain its objectives only when it is backed by sufficient armed force. In negotiating the Washington treaties American diplomats had substituted idealistic aspiration in place of armed force as the governing principle in Far Eastern relations. Belief in such ideals as the pacific settlement of disputes and the efficacy of fair dealing in international affairs was, in the Navy view, characteristic of all levels of the American polity. The historical origins of American idealism in international affairs stemmed from traditional American isolation, free security, pacifism, and antimilitarism; from capitalism, with its emphasis on materialism and individualism; and from the constitutional separation of the armed forces from the civilian agencies of the government responsible for foreign policy.

In the Navy view the effect of these factors was revealed in America's willingness to pursue "disarmament by example" at Washington in 1921-1922 and again at London in 1930. Thus, in consenting to the naval limitations of the Washington Five Power Treaty and the London Naval Treaty, American diplomatists demonstrated how naive Americans really were about what determined international relationships. Furthermore, national political leaders had proved unable or unwilling to oppose these popular but fundamentally misguided beliefs about the nature of American national interest and national security.[7]

The Navy's objections to naval arms limitations during the 1920's and 1930's are too easily dismissed on the grounds of self-interest and professional pique. Were these the only motives, then the Navy's concern for the strategic dilemmas of a war in the Pacific would have been little more than a cloak to justify larger naval appropriations rather than an honest appraisal of what the Navy believed to be the growing discordance between American Far Eastern policy and the nation's ability to support that policy with force. Certainly Adm. James O. Richardson, Adm. Husband Kimmel's predecessor as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet, in 1940 expressed his belief that most Navy planning was dictated by self-interest.[8] Furthermore, it may be concluded that the Navy's opposition to naval arms limitations throughout the 1920's and 1930's was motivated largely by the angry shock of watching the fleet of its 1916 and 1919 building programs being destroyed at Washington in 1921-1922 without firing a shot. Such evidence suggests that what actually inspired Navy criticism of the course the nation pursued in foreign affairs in these years was largely, if not

altogether, solicitude for its budget and nothing more.

Compelling though this argument may be, it ignores the alternative that criticism, no matter how self-serving its origins, may reveal important truths. One such truth, which the Navy repeatedly remarked upon in the interwar years, was the lack of coordination exhibited in policy and defense planning in the Far East.

It was the dangerous instability of the Far East in the aftermath of World War I, combined with universal concern for the naval race developing among the British, Americans, and Japanese that led the United States to convene the Washington Conference in the first place. The Conference met in an atmosphere still highly charged with the promise of a new order of things that had emerged from President Woodrow Wilson's program for a League of Nations, despite Congressional refusal to join the League. Many delegates attending the Conference shared the belief that two causes of the late war were the balance of power, which depended upon force to maintain it, and competition in naval armaments. Delegates to the Washington Conference accepted at least publicly the premise that stability in Far Eastern relations could be achieved by substituting equitable economic arrangements and political guarantees for the balance of power. Collaterally, they agreed that a limitation on naval armaments, especially among the Big Three, would remove another source of friction, both in the Far East and in the world at large. Thus the Washington Conference replaced exclusionary economic and political relationships in the Far East with the Open Door and with promises to respect both the territorial integrity of China and the political status quo. Secondly, the Conference acknowledged the legitimate claim of nations to defense forces sufficient to maintain their security. On this basis the delegates sought to limit naval forces in such a way as to eliminate the possibility that the navy of one nation might threaten another.[9]

The delegates believed they had realized these interrelated objectives in three major treaties: the Nine Power, Four Power, and Five Power pacts. Although there were various signatories to each of these agreements, it was accord among the three major naval powers that gave them substance.

In brief, the Nine Power Treaty provided a formal order for the transaction of international political and economic affairs in China. It relied on two allegedly interdependent propositions: maintenance of China's administrative and territorial integrity, and respect for the principle of the Open Door in commercial and financial affairs. The Four Power Treaty superseded the Anglo-Japanese alliance and also committed the signatories to respect the territorial status quo in the Pacific. The last of these pacts and, in the Navy view, the most portentous, the Five Power Treaty, limited the major navies in both the tonnage of specific categories of combat craft and their characteristics, such as gunpower and armor. Most important of all was the ratio system of apportioning tonnages by category to the British, American, Japanese, French, and Italian navies.

Although tonnage and characteristics restrictions were important considerations in ending the incipient naval arms race, the ratio system was the key to security. Accordingly, the critics of limitation focused most of their attention on the ratios themselves. The British, Americans, and Japanese under the terms of the agreement could build capital ships and carriers in the ratio of 5:5:3 respectively. Because most strategists maintained faith in the battleline as the preponderant naval weapon, the treaty limitations in the Navy view had left the United States with a minimal margin of superiority over the Japanese fleet. This situation was alarming

enough, but to the Navy's consternation Article 19 of the Treaty all but wiped out this margin by prohibiting the signatories from further developing their base facilities in the Western Pacific.[10] Furthermore the delegates were unable to agree on how to extend the ratio system to auxiliary combat craft, thus deflecting competition to these types rather than ending it altogether.

It was at London in 1930 that the Japanese, Americans, and British finally managed to end the naval race in cruisers and submarines. Over sharp Navy opposition, the 1930 London Naval Treaty modified in Japan's favor the Washington ratios as applied to auxiliaries. The Treaty also complicated naval planning by creating a new category of light cruiser for which the Navy initially had nothing but distaste.[11]

The last attempt at naval arms limitation, the London Naval Conference of 1935-1936 and the treaty it produced, signed by Britain, the United States, and France, provoked no strong objection from the Navy. Japan, deeply involved in Manchuria and North China and under intense criticism abroad, abandoned naval limitations by category and refused to sign the 1936 London Treaty. By 1936 a naval limitations treaty could at best be only of symbolic significance, expressing the dedication of the signatories to the principle without binding them absolutely. Significantly for the future, however, the negotiations paved the way for subsequent cooperation between the British and American governments on naval matters. Furthermore, by the mid-1930's the Roosevelt administration and Congress both had responded gratifyingly to the Navy's requests for more ships and personnel.[12]

In spite of the apparent upswing in the Navy's fortunes between 1933 and 1936 the discordance that plagued American Far Eastern diplomatic policy became more pronounced in following years. With the outbreak of hostilities between China and Japan in July 1937, the possibility of a clash between the United States and Japan became increasingly real.

The United States between 1931 and 1941 made three attempts to impede the Japanese as they moved first into Manchuria, then into China and up the Yangtze valley, destroying not only Chinese soldiers, but American lives, property, and business interests as well. The first attempt was to invoke the principles of the Kellogg-Briand and Nine Power Treaties, both of which the Japanese had signed. Such a policy relied upon the force of world public opinion to halt the Japanese. The second attempt, following a lengthy government debate after the outbreak of war in 1937, was to impose steadily mounting economic pressure against Japan. The third attempt was to station the U.S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor, where it symbolically, at least, would stand as a reminder to the Japanese of America's military might. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 is eloquent testimony that they found none of these impediments sufficient reason to abandon their policies in China.

The debacle begun at Pearl Harbor in December 1941 was not altogether unforeseen by the Navy. Only the audacity and the spectacular, if limited, success of the Japanese were truly surprising. By the late 1920's, if not earlier, the Navy abandoned the increasingly specious assumption that the British posed a threat to American interests. That left only Japan as a potential opponent, a strategic situation the Navy had studied continuously since early in the century.[13]

In this respect, the warnings raised by U.S. Navy officers about Japan and the criticisms they directed at American participation in arms limitations agreements seem prescient when measured against the events in the Pacific between 1931 and 1941. The Navy argued that

the Japanese were not to be trusted in signing the Washington Treaties. Because the Japanese Navy thereafter had superiority in the Western Pacific guaranteed to it by the Five Power Treaty, it was obvious that the rest of the agreements at Washington depended upon Japan's willingness to play the game according to the rules. In the Navy's view there was nothing in Japanese history, especially since Japan's emergence as a modern military and industrial state at the end of the 19th century, that justified such faith. On the contrary, so far as the Navy was concerned, the feudal and militaristic elements in Japanese culture and its record of imperialism since the Sino-Japanese War in 1894 meant that Japan was unlikely to abide by agreements written according to Western notions of the comity of nations.[14] Japan's attempt to resolve its economic difficulties by seizing Manchuria in 1931 only underscored the Navy's convictions.

There were other reasons for the Navy's lack of faith in the arrangements made at Washington and subsequently, reasons not grounded on the peculiarities of Japanese culture and nationalism. These had to do with the Navy's concept of national interest, of the relationship between strategy and policy in the promotion of national interest, and of the nature of the forces governing international life. Behind the Navy's often highly technical criticisms of the conduct of arms limitations negotiations lay a well-rationalized view of the way foreign policy ought to be conducted.

This view owed much to the writings of Adm. Alfred Thayer Mahan. American naval officers believed their view of the world derived from a realistic evaluation of history. Mahan and others who wrote on military and diplomatic subjects had, these officers were convinced, demonstrated that historically certain principles always underlay successful national policy. Accordingly Mahan had shown correctly that promotion and defense of the national interest had meant and would always mean facilitating the commercial, financial, and cultural ventures of the nation's citizens abroad. Such activity demanded that the nation provide adequate military force to protect the persons and property of its citizens in foreign parts. In its broadest sense, the object of policy and strategy properly coordinated was to insure respect for the legitimate interests of Americans against encroachment. It was virtually certain that other nations would always seek to curtail American economic expansion by diplomacy or by force if necessary. Because nations, like men, were impelled by self-interest, and because international life is always characterized by competition, other nations invariably would try to exploit America's every weakness.

In the Navy view here lay a fundamental principle governing relations between states. Because the natural state of affairs in international life is characteristically a struggle, economically, politically, and often militarily, wise statesmen always possess force sufficient to defend their policies in an arena where other contestants are potentially hostile. The only assured means of forestalling the tendency of nations to resort to force is by confronting all comers with adequate military strength and making known the intention to use it. Although the Navy acknowledged that the threat of force is not always a successful deterrent, it argued that force is ultimately the only credible support for policy.

Translated into a practical naval policy, this view prescribes the formula articulated by Mahan and his successors. National prosperity requires foreign trade; without it an advanced industrial economy would grow moribund for lack of export markets and a source of raw materials. But foreign commerce, in competition for the markets of the world, requires territory capable of

serving both as an entrepot for trade and as a fleet base. The nation has to have a navy adequate to command respect for its policies abroad in time of peace and to control the sealanes in the event of crisis or war.

If these conditions were adequately met, the nation would be well-served in the constant struggle among states for the limited wealth of the world. Any other course, such as that pursued by the United States after 1922, would court disaster by encouraging other nations to exploit American weaknesses. What the American delegation had done at Washington was to render the nation incapable of projecting its military forces into an area of the world where another power stood ready and willing to eradicate American interests when and if it wished to do so. The Navy throughout the 1920's and 1930's never completely shook the conviction that ultimately in the Far East, inadequate American seapower, reflecting a poorly conceived national policy, would lead to a war in which America initially would be at a grave disadvantage.

In spite of the constant shortages of ships, men, and money, the indefinite nature of America's Far Eastern commitments, and the hostility of large sections of Congress and the public toward the objectives the Navy sought, the Navy did not change the nature of its views or the focus of its planning between 1922 and the outbreak of war in Europe. Although there was a dramatic reversal of strategic priorities between 1939 and 1940, the basic concepts underlying the Navy's view of strategy and policy remained constant. Until the war in Europe and the precarious fate of the British Empire made it imperative to concentrate on the Atlantic, the Navy's central concern remained the Pacific and how to maintain what it believed to be America's vital interests there. It was on this basis that the Navy had predicated its needs for two decades.[15]

The Navy made its plans virtually in isolation within the government during the interwar years. No agency within the executive branch existed to coordinate policy and strategy systematically. Repeated demands by naval planning officers for clarification of American policy in the Pacific respecting the Philippines and the Open Door often went unheeded.[16] Such responses as the Navy did receive were hortatory injunctions in the vein of Secretary of State Cordell Hull's repeated demands that Japan observe the principle of the Open Door in China. Guided by its own convictions of what policy ought to be and what strategy required, the Navy believed such protests as Hull's were noble but fruitless. These protests were fruitless, in the Navy's opinion, because of the all too obvious dichotomy between America's economic and political frontiers, encompassing the Philippines and China, and the defense perimeter the nation was capable of defending, which lay 3,000 miles to the East. In these circumstances the Navy never wavered in its insistence that the latter should be extended westward from Hawaii rather than withdrawing the

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

A graduate of Reed College, Michael Doyle earned his M.A. at the University of Washington, where he is now a teaching assistant in history. He is also an instructor in American Diplomatic History at Pacific Lutheran University, Tacoma. Currently a doctoral candidate at the University of Washington, he is writing his dissertation on how the U.S. Navy dealt with the perceived imbalance between American foreign policy in the Far East and the means available to defend that policy in the face of Japanese aggression.

nation's political and economic commitment into the Eastern Pacific.[17]

Whether or not American Far Eastern policy would have been more successful during the interwar years had the Navy's program been fulfilled is necessarily a moot question. Certainly many Navy officers before and after Pearl Harbor believed a large fleet and bases at Guam or Manila would have caused the Japanese to forego their expansion into China and southward. Whatever the accuracy of these officers' assessment, their criticism correctly identified the lack of coordination between defense and foreign policies as a major source of confusion and weakness in American Far Eastern policy in the interwar years. While American involvement in the Second World War did end the cleavage previously separating civilian and military officials within the government, it is ironic that the Pacific war and the eventual American victory in 1945 produced so little in terms of U.S. political objectives in the Pacific.

The historian and former diplomat George Kennan has pointed out that the only victory America could claim in the Pacific was defeat of Japanese imperialism. The Chinese revolution, culminating in 1949, rendered meaningless America's claim of protecting the Open Door, the territorial integrity, and the administrative integrity of China. In the new constellation of power relationships beginning to emerge in 1950, the United States found itself engaged in a land war on the Asian mainland, its former ally a bitter enemy, and its former enemy an ally.

NOTES

List of Abbreviations

GBR	Records of the General Board
JB	Joint Army-Navy Board
JBR	Records of the Joint Army-Navy Board
LC	Library of Congress
NA	National Archives
NHC	Naval History Collection
NHD	Naval History Division
NHF	Naval History Foundation
NMR	New Military Records
NO	Office of Naval Operations
NWC	Naval War College
OA	Operational Archives of the Navy
OMR	Old Military Records
SC File	Secret and Confidential File, Office of Naval Operations

1. Joint Army-Navy Basic War Plan ORANGE, 10 Jan 1929, JB 325 (Ser. 328), JBR, OMR, NA, RG 225. CNO to SECNAV, 15 Jan 1941, A16-3/EF37, NO, SC File, Secret Correspondence 1941, NMR, NA, RG 38, microfilm, reel 7. Limitation of Naval Armaments, 1935; Report of the Staff, NHC, NWC, RG 8, box 45, XPOD(1934-1935).

2. Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; historical manuscript, "The War Against Japan," Lt. Grace P. Hayes, USN, 1 6, NMR, NA, RG 218.

3. Sen Mbr JB to SECNAV, 23 Oct 1931, EG52, forwarding JB 305 (Ser. 499), NO, SC File, Confidential Correspondence 1927-1939, NMR, NA, RG 38, microfilm, reel 42. Operations Problem IV, 1933, NHC, NWC, RG 4, box 63, 2261-AA et. seq.

4. Chmn Gen Board to SECNAV, 31 Aug 1939, Serial No. 1868, Subject File No. 425, 1938-1939, GBR, OA, NHD.

5. CINCAF to CNO, 11 Feb 1937, NB/ND16, NO, SC File, Secret Correspondence 1927-1940, NMR, NA, RG 38, microfilm, reel 17. Limitation of Naval Armaments, 1935; Report of the Staff—Comments by Capt. W. Van Auken, USN, Capt. R.C. Macfall, USN, Cmdr. M.L. Deyo, USN, *loc. cit.*

6. The exploratory studies for the RAINBOW series were begun by the Joint Planning Committee in late 1938, and were adopted by the Joint Board on 21 Aug 1939. See JB 325 (Ser. 634), JBR, OMR, NA, RG 225. The shift away from a "Pacific First" strategy culminated with Adm. Harold Stark's "Plan Dog," approved as a memorandum by the Joint Board on 21 Dec 1940 as JB 325 (Ser. 670), JRB, OMR, RG 225.

7. Evidence of the Navy's distaste for the trend in naval disarmament from the Washington Conference through the collapse of naval arms limitation in 1936 is abundant in both published and unpublished sources. The themes discussed above found their way into numerous articles appearing in the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* in the years between the World Wars. For an extreme statement of such views see Capt. Dudley W. Knox, USN (Ret.), "National Strategy," lecture delivered at the Naval War College, 7 Oct 1932, NHC, NWC, RG 15.

8. CINCUS to CNO, 22 Oct 1940, A16/FF1, NO, SC Files, Secret Correspondence 1927-1940, NMR, NA, RG 38, microfilm, reel 4.

9. A great deal of work has been done on the Washington Conference. Still excellent is Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Toward a New Order of Sea Power* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1940). Other important works that treat the Conference in a wider setting are William Braisted, *The United States Navy in the Pacific*, 1900-1922 (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1971) and Stephen Roskill, *Naval Policy Between the Wars* Vol. I (New York: Walker, 1968). For the most recent evaluation of the United States and the Conference, see Thomas H. Buckley, *The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922* (Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1970).

10. For a broad analysis and thorough indictment of the concessions the United States made at Washington see the semiofficial document prepared by William H. Gardiner, "Memorandum on Naval Matters," 25 Oct 1924, copy in the Adm. Hilary P. Jones Papers, NHF, LC.

11. Raymond G. O'Connor, *Perilous Equilibrium* (Lawrence: Univ. of Kansas Press, 1962), pp. 111-114.

12. Capt. Tracy B. Kittredge, "United States—British Cooperation," COMNAVEU monograph, microfilm copy in OA, NHD, pp. 1-2, 13-18, 37-38.

13. *Reminiscences of Admiral Richard L. Conolly* (New York: Oral History Research Office, Columbia Univ., 1960), transcript in OA, NHD, pp. 54-56, 75-76. Braisted, pp. 3-8, 289-309, 667-688.

14. Capt. R.A. Koch, "BLUE-ORANGE Study," (1933), NHC, NWC, RG 8, box 23, UNOpP.

15. Knox, "National Strategy," *loc. cit.* JB 305, 1924-1934, JBR 1919-1938, OMR, NA, RG 225.

16. Capt. Adolphus Staton, USN, Memorandum, "Joint War Planning," 25 Feb 1932, Subject File No. 425, 1931-1937, GBR, OA, NHD. Capt. H.M. Jensen, USN, "Policy and Naval Warfare," Staff Presentations 1937-1938, v. 1, NHC, NWC, RG 13.

17. Report of American-Dutch-British Conversations, Apr 1941, JB 301, JBR, OMR, NA, RG 225.